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This paper uses the unique social structure of Arab communities to examine the effect of 
social identity on voter turnout. We first show that voters are more likely to vote for a 
candidate who shares their social group (signified by last name) as compared to other 
candidates. Using last name as a measure of group affiliation, we find an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between group size and voter turnout which is consistent with theoretical models 
that reconcile the paradox of voting by incorporating groups behavior. 
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Introducing the role of group membership in determining the decision to vote seems to 
be one of the more promising routes to reconcile the voting paradox. The pure self-
interest approach fails to account for actual political participation because the 
probability that a single vote would affect elections results is very small in large 
populations. In contrast, acting as part of a particular group, as suggested by social 
identity theory, may fundamentally change the probability of affecting an election 
outcome or the benefits from the act of voting and therefore the incentive to vote. 
 
Attempts to explain the relatively high political participation in the real world by taking 
into consideration the importance of groups have been made by both economists and 
political scientists.
2 Yet, to date there is scarce empirical evidence on the importance of 
groups for voter turnout. 
 
Based on three congressional elections, Uhlaner (1989) presented indicative evidence 
that is in line with the group membership hypothesis by showing that individual that are 
associated with a particular group- union households- tend to vote more than non-union 
households. In a more systematic empirical examination, Filer et al (1993) found that 
turnout first declines and then increases along with increases in relative income and 
conclude that this finding is consistent with a rational model of voting that incorporates 
group behavior.
3 Coate and Conlin (2004) share the same conclusion based on a 
structural estimation of a group-utilitarian model using voter turnout in liquor referenda 
in Texas. While these last two empirical works are suggestive, the effect of group 
membership on actual political participation has not yet been tested directly.
4 
 
The goal of this paper is to examine directly the effect of social identity on voter turnout 
in local elections in Israel. The unique social grouping of Arab communities, unlike the 
                                                  
2 In Economics, two recent papers, inspired by Harsani (1980), explore the effect of groups on 
individuals' decisions to vote in a general and large election (Feddersen and Sandroni, 2006 and Coate 
and Conlin, 2004). In Political Science, the role of groups appears in Uhlaner (1989), Morton (1991) and 
Filer et al (1993). 
3 See also Shamir and Arian (1999) who have shown that social cleavages are important in structuring the 
vote in Israel. 
4 Fowler and Kam (2007) present a direct test on the effect of social identity on voter turnout using 
laboratory experiments.    3
Western structure of Jewish society, offers an almost ideal “experiment” to directly test 
the effect of group membership on voter turnout.  
 
The social structure of a typical Arab village/town in the Middle East, including the 
Arab population in Israel, is commonly composed of several distinct groups called 
hamulas (plural of hamula. Later we use hamulas instead of hamulas). A hamula is 
defined by anthropologists as a group of large number of families that share a common 
great-grandfather and are organized in a lineage of separate type.
5 The hamula has a 
long history of rich relations among its members, such as intra-marriage and a substitute 
arrangement for capital and insurance markets (Cohen, 1965).  
 
Frequently, an Arab community consists of two to four hamulas where each hamula 
lives in a different geographical quarter. The unique social structure in Arab 
communities should be expected to have a noteworthy effect on voting patterns and 
voter turnout in local elections if the hamula is an influential social group. There is 
suggestive evidence that indeed a hamula is an important component of self-concept for 
many Arab individuals, consistent with Tajfel (1981) definition of social identity.
6  
 
Tajfel (1981) define social identity as, "that part of an individual's self-concept which 
derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group together with the value 
and emotional significance attached to the membership" (p.255). The social identity 
theory suggests that individuals care not only about their own benefits but also about 
the benefits to their affiliated group members. Benefits are of a symbolic nature, such as 
respect and perceived status according to this theory (Huddy, 2003). 
 
Do hamula members actually vote for a seemingly hamula-based list in local elections 
as would be predicted by social identity theory? In the first part of our empirical 
investigation we test whether voters with a particular last name, which serves as a proxy 
for hamula affiliation, are more likely to vote for a candidate with the same last name as 
compared to other candidates. We find strong empirical support for hamula-based-
voting behavior. Hamula-based candidates receive significantly more votes from their 
                                                  
5  See Cohen (1965), Rosenfeld (1974) and Al-Haj (1988) for more detailed definition of a hamula. 
6 In some cases it takes the extreme form of assigning children to different classes in a school by their 
hamula affiliation.   4
affiliated hamula members. This suggests that a hamula is indeed a meaningful social 
group in the political arena. 
 
The second main prediction of social identity theory with regard to political behavior is 
that individuals who feel part of a group are more likely to participate in elections 
(Fowler and Kam, 2007).
7 The implication in our context is that voter turnout in Arab 
municipalities should be higher than that in Jewish municipalities, which have relatively 
similar social structures to typical Western communities. The second part of our 
empirical investigation shows that actual voter turnout in Arab municipalities is 
significantly higher than in Jewish municipalities even after controlling for the standard 
factors influencing political participation.   
 
Then, using last name as a measure of hamula affiliation, we construct the distribution 
of group size in all Arab localities in Israel. It allows us to test the more subtle 
prediction of group membership models with regard to the effect of group size on voter 
turnout. For example, Feddersen and Sandroni (2006) show that social group size has an 
inverted U-shape impact on voter turnout in a two-party system. This prediction is 
based on the assumption that part of the population is ethical type of individuals (social 
identifiers) that care also about the welfare of their own social group. The intuition of 
that result is that if one social group is large enough it would be more efficient for a 
small share of that group to show up to win the elections in contrast to the case where 
the two social groups are of equal size.  
 
However, the relationship between social group size and voter turnout becomes more 
complicated in multi-party elections. In fact, Coate and Conlin (2004) show that even in 
a two-party system, relations between group size and voter turnout is unclear but their 
simulation nevertheless generates an inverted U-shape similar to Feddersen and 
Sandroni (2006). We find evidence that voter turnout is affected by hamula size: voter 
turnout is positively associates with hamula size at lower levels and then it declines as 
hamula size increases, which is in line with the inverted U-shape hypothesis.  
 
                                                  
7  Note that unlike altruist agents who care about the benefits of all other members in society, social 
identifiers care about the welfare of a particular group of individuals. Fowler and Kam (2007) present a 
very neat framework where altruism and social identity political motives are separated.    5
The relatively low impact of Arab citizens on national elections outcome is another 
factor that may play a role in understanding their political participation in local 
elections.  According to the compensation hypothesis, the Arab citizens in Israel tend to 
vote at lower rates in general elections because they feel less attached to Jewish nature 
of Israel than Jewish citizens. It results in compensating behavior which may affect 
participation in local elections. This hypothesis is rejected by the data. 
 
In the next section we present the voter turnout puzzle in Israeli local elections and in 
Section 3 we provide the theoretical background to guide our empirical investigation. In 
Section 4 we examine the two main hypotheses that stem from social identity theory. In 
Section 5 the compensation hypothesis is presented and tested. Section 6 concludes the 
paper. 
 
2. The voter turnout puzzle in Israeli local elections 
Comparative data on political participation in developed countries shows that voter 
turnout in local elections is in general lower than that of general elections for parliament 
or presidency. The gap between national and local elections is noticeable in developed 
countries and on average is around 14 percent (Blais, 2000). There is relatively wide 
variance in that the gap is large in English-speaking countries (US, UK and New 
Zealand), while it is small in continental Europe. Japan (and to some extent Belgium) 
represents an exceptional case where voter turnout in local elections is higher than in 
national elections. 
 
The greater importance of national elections is the common explanation for its higher 
voter turnout (Morlan, 1984). In national elections citizens elect a body which makes 
decisions that have more significant impact on their welfare as compared to local 
elections, and therefore they tend to vote at higher rates. 
 
Voter turnout in local elections in Israel is lower relative to national elections, as in 
most developed countries. The voter turnout in the Israeli national elections held in 
2003 was approximately 68 percent, as compared to 51 percent in local elections in the 
same year (but not the same day). Similar to English-speaking countries the gap in favor 
of voter turnout in national elections is around 20 percentage points (last three election 
campaigns).   6
 
However, the average voter turnout in local elections hides substantial differences in 
political participation between Arab and Jewish municipalities. Voter turnout in Jewish 
municipalities is lower than that of Jewish citizens in national elections as found for 
most developed countries. In contrast, Arab citizens tend to vote at much higher rates in 
local elections relative to national elections. 
 
In the last local elections (2003) voter turnout in Arab municipalities stood at close to 
90 percent, while the average participation in national elections in those same 
municipalities was 63 percent only (Table 1a). The high voter turnout of Arab 
municipalities is not unique to the last elections; in fact it has been incredibly high since 
the first local elections (Chart 1). 
 
The very high voter turnout in Arab municipalities is puzzling in light of two factors. 
First, those municipalities tend to experience recurrent financial crises (associated with 
low quality of local services) which may tend to deter potential voters. Second, the high 
voter turnout implies very active participation of Arab women, who are usually 
discouraged to be that active in other areas of life such as labor force participation.
8 
Moreover, not even a single female is found among hundreds of mayoral candidates 
despite the very high voter turnout among women. 
 
It is commonly hypothesized that the high political participation rate in Arab 
municipalities is related to the unique social structure of Arab communities.
9 Most of 
the literature on the link between voter turnout in local elections and social structure of 
Arab communities is of a descriptive nature. Two exceptions are the studies by Cohen 
(1965) and Al-Haj (1988), who have explored the strength of hamula throughout most 
of the twentieth century. They both provide descriptive evidence that lend support for 
the hamula-based-voting hypothesis, although their investigation was limited to one 
municipality. Another hypothesis is that voter turnout in local elections is high because 
of lower turnout in national elections. We will come back to this in Section 5. 
 
 
                                                  
8 The average labor force participation of Arab women in Israel is around 20 percent- much lower than 
that of Jewish women which is close to 60 percent. 
9 See Cohen (1965), Al-Haj (1988), Landau (1993), Goldberg (2001) and Ozechki-Lazar (2005).   7
3. Theoretical background and econometric models 
According to social identity theory, individuals derive utility from affiliating with social 
groups (Tajfel, 1981). There are two empirical implications of social identity theory that 
will be presented in the form of hypotheses and examined in the empirical section. First, 
some people act politically for the benefit of their groups by voting for candidates that 
favor their social group's interests (i.e., the hamula-based-voting-hypothesis). These 
individuals are instrumental, but only as part of a group. Second, people with a sense of 
attachment to a certain social group are expected to participate in elections more than 
those individuals who are mainly self-interested. However, political participation should 
be affected by the size of a social group (i.e., the group size hypothesis). 
 
3.1 Hypothesis I: hamula-based-voting hypothesis 
A key feature of the hamula throughout its history, which dates back to the period of 
Ottoman Empire, is a marriage between paternal cousins that has been the basic channel 
by which different branches of the hamula link themselves and form a descent group. 
For example, Al-Haj (1988) found that in the town of Sefaram the majority of (large) 
hamula members marry within the hamula. The intra-marriage in hamulas  of 500 
members or more is 57%. 
 
The hamula has also an economic role. In the last century, the economic role played by 
the  hamula has been transformed as more and more Arab communities became 
urbanized. In the agrarian economy period, the hamula provided to some extent a 
substitute for capital and insurance markets (Cohen, 1965). However, in recent decades 
monetary transfers between hamula members play a negligible role (Al-Haj, 1988). 
 
As Arab communities became more urbanized, and in particular after democratic local 
elections were introduced in Israeli Arab villages/towns (in the late 1950s), hamula 
economics has became in those early years more linked to local elections. The winning 
hamula-based-party could gain not only reputation and honor but also the opportunity 
of channeling municipal resources. They may have provided a better infrastructure to 
their hamula district and lower effective local taxes to some of its members. In recent 
years, using municipal resources to benefit hamula members seems to be more limited 
due to effective monitoring by the Ministry of Interior (Stacklov, 2008). 
   8
In such a social environment it would be natural to expect the emergence of hamula-
based-candidates, and the obvious prediction of social identity theory is that hamula 
members would be more likely to vote for hamula-based-candidates in local elections. 
If indeed the hamula is an important social group, a member of a particular hamula- 
represented by a certain last name is expected to vote for a candidate that is affiliated 
with that particular hamula. This can be summarized in the following econometric 
model to be estimated below: 
 
(1)    ijm ijm m ijm v cD b a y + + + =  
 
where yijm represent the votes (in percentage points) for a candidate with a certain last 
name  i in a ballot box j in a municipality m and bm denotes a fixed effect for a 
municipality. Dijm gets a value of one if the last name of a candidate i match the last 
name of part or all of the residents who are assigned to vote in ballot box j (in 
municipality m), and zero otherwise. We expect that the coefficient c would be positive 
and quantitatively meaningful if indeed social identity plays a key role in voting 
behavior of hamula members. 
 
3.2 Hypothesis II: the group size hypothesis 
We first explore the unambiguous prediction of social identity theory according to 
which social identifiers are more likely to participate in elections (Fowler and Kam, 
2007). The estimated model is: 
 
(2)    m m 2 m 1 0 m D X Y ε + α + α + α = , 
 
where Ym is the natural logarithm of the ratio of voter turnout in a municipality m over 
1 minus voter turnout, as is often done in the voter turnout literature. Xm reflects a 
vector of explanatory variables that are frequently used to explain voter turnout in local 
elections. Dm is a dummy variable that gets a value of one for an Arab municipality 
which is hypothesized to be more social identifiers type of community and receives a 
value of zero for a Jewish municipality which is assumed to be a more self-interested 
type of community. 
    9
Then, the ambiguous prediction regarding the effect of group size on voter turnout is 
estimated which completes our investigation. Feddersen and Sandroni (2006) show that 
in a two-party system the relation between the size of a social group and voter turnout is 
of inverted U-shape form. In their theoretical framework, there are two groups of 
individuals where each group consists of both ethical agents and self-interested 
individuals. 
 
The incentive to participate on part of an ethical individual is affected by the chances of 
winning of his or her affiliated group. Obviously, the probability of winning the election 
is influenced by the relative size of the two social groups. The voter turnout tends to 
zero if one group is close to 100%. In that case, political participation of a small 
fraction of the large group is enough to win the election. In contrast, political 
participation is expected to be relative high if the two groups are of identical size 
(50%). 
 
It would be easy to show that using social identifiers instead of ethical agents (or “doing 
their part” type of individuals) generates the same implication concerning the inverted 
U-shape relations between political participation and group size. As with the previous 
econometric model, group size, or in our context hamula size, is not the only factor 
affecting voter turnout and other variables should be included in our analysis. We 
would estimate the following model: 
 
(3)    m
2
m 4 m 3 m 1 0 m e S S X Y + β + β + β + β =  
 
where Ym and Xm are exactly the same as before (Equation 2) and Sm denotes a measure 
of hamula size in municipality m. The inverted U-shape relations between group size 
and voter turnout, following our interpretation of Feddersen and Sandroni (2006) to the 
case of social identity, implies that β3 should be positive and β4 negative.  
 
We would use various measures to explore the effect of group size on voter turnout. 
Our main measure is the relative size of the biggest hamula. For a robustness check we 
use also the biggest two, three and four hamulas as alternative measures of group size. 
These simple measures of group size have the advantage of being not sensitive to the 
municipality's population size. However, these measures do not summarize the whole   10
distribution of group size as does the Herfindhal-Hirschman index. For this reason, we 
also employ a Herfindhal-Hirschman index (normalized) of hamula concentration as a 
measure of group size. 
 
The main factors, in addition to social identity, that are likely to explain voter turnout in 
local elections include the number of eligible voters, income per capita, the extent of 
political competition and voter turnout in general elections. These variables are 
measured at the municipality level. In earlier stages of this work several other variables 
(such as demographic composition, population density and income inequality) were 
included, but none of them appears to generate a robust effect on voter turnout. 
 
The size of municipality population and political competition both represent indicators 
for the probability of casting a decisive vote and should have a positive effect on voter 
turnout in light of the instrumental view of voting. Income level often reflects the 
potential benefits of voting in individual-based research. However, in our context the 
average resident in a wealthy municipality should not benefit necessarily more or less 
than the average resident in a poor municipality. Residents in municipalities with higher 
levels of income may vote at higher rates to the extent that wealthier residents are also 
better informed. Income per capita may also capture the value of time to participate in 
local elections and that has a negative effect on voter turnout. 
 
Political competition is measured here as the difference between the votes for the 
winner and those for the candidate next to him/her, divided by the total number of votes 
in the mayoral elections. In a similar fashion, a political competition index is computed 
for the previous two elections campaigns to deal with the risk of endogeneity. 
Candidates may wish to invest more resources to attract more voters if they expect the 
race to be very close (Shachar and Nalebuff, 1999). Thus, voter turnout might be higher 
in a close race not only because of the perceived likelihood of casting a decisive vote, 
(supply side effect) but also due to more funds spent by candidates (demand side 
effect). 
 
In this paper, the average national voter turnout in each municipality represents an 
indicator for a sense of civic duty of the average municipality resident. A municipality 
with a high voter turnout in general elections may indicate a higher benefit from the act 
of voting for citizens in that locality according to the expressive view of voting.   11
However, the variation in national voter turnout across municipalities may also capture 
differences in omitted variables. That risk is limited here given that our list of 
explanatory variables includes two important municipality characteristics: population 
size and per capita income. 
 
4. The empirical analysis 
4.1 Local elections in Israel 
Voting in local or national elections is not legally required in Israel. In local elections 
the voter may cast two votes (in two different colors), one for a mayor and one for a 
municipality council. The elections for mayor and council members are held on the 
same day. Local and national elections took place on the same day in the first three 
decades of the State of Israel. Since 1978, however, local elections have been held 
every five years and are separate from national elections. 
 
In 1978, direct and personal elections for mayor were inaugurated while elections for 
council members continue to take place according to proportional representation rules. 
To win the mayoral election a candidate has to receive at least 40 percent of the vote. 
Otherwise a second round between the two candidates who received the largest number 
of votes must take place, and the winning candidate is the one receiving the majority of 
the votes. 
 
4.2 The data 
We developed two different data sets to test each of these two hypotheses described 
above. The unit of observation in the first data set is a ballot box while it is a 
municipality in the second. The first data set comprises local elections results in 354 
ballot boxes in 35 Arab municipalities. Almost half (49%) of the Arab population in 
Israel lives in those 35 municipalities and the average voter turnout in those same 
municipalities is similar to that in the general Arab population (Tables 1a and 1b). 
 
In those municipalities, the eligible residents are allocated to ballot boxes according to 
the first letter of their last name, unlike all other Arab and Jewish municipalities where 
residents are assigned by place of residence.
10 In a particular ballot box a few letters are 
assigned and thus more than one surname is included in that ballot box. The average 
                                                  
10  In some of those municipalities, residents are assigned to ballot boxes according to the first two letters 
of their last name or a combination of the first letter in their first and last names.   12
number of eligible residents assigned to a ballot box is more than 700 (Table 1b). This 
assignment of residents has a long history and is done solely by the Ministry of the 
Interior.  
 
Our data set also includes the last name of each candidate in those 35 municipalities. 
For each ballot box we have the actual number of votes that each candidate receives. 
The unique way by which residents in those municipalities are assigned to ballot boxes 
allows us to test directly the first hypothesis of whether residents in these municipalities 
vote for hamula-based candidates. 
 
The full dataset covers 394 ballot boxes in 44 municipalities but in five municipalities 
the first letters of two different last names of two (or more) candidates both appear in 
the same ballot box. In those cases, it would not be possible to use our identification 
strategy to estimate the importance of hamula-base voting. Our identification strategy 
could not be useful also if there are exactly two candidates and they both have the same 
last name. There are four such municipalities in our data. Therefore, we exclude these 
nine municipalities and the regression analysis is based on 354 ballot boxes in 35 
municipalities. 
 
The other 31 Arab municipalities, where residents are assigned by geographical 
criterion, could not be used due to lack of information on the joint distribution of voters' 
last names and place of residence (within municipality).  
 
The second data set that is employed here covers 186 municipalities that consist of 111 
Jewish localities and 75 Arab localities.
11 Some municipalities consist of both Jews and 
Arabs and a municipality is defined here as Jewish if more than a half of its population 
is of Jewish origin; likewise, a municipality is defined as Arab if more than a half of its 
population is of Arab origin. 
 
This paper uses voter turnout in the first round in mayoral elections that took place in 
the year 2003.
12 Employing panel data is not an option given that the Interior Ministry 
                                                  
11 There are 210 regular municipalities and 54 regional municipalities (a collection of several villages, 
mainly agricultural) in Israel, but due to data limitations our research covers 186 (elections results are 
missing for 10 municipalities and income per capita data does not exist for the other 14 municipalities). 
12  We include also those municipalities that for various reasons held elections one and two years before 
or after 2003.    13
provided us with data on the key variables (such as the distribution of last names) for 
only one point in time (2003). As can be seen from Figure 2, voter turnout is fairly 
stable over time. In contrast, the variation in voter turnout across municipalities is 
relatively large. In addition, focusing on cross section variation opens the possibility of 
using lag variables to deal with the risk of endogeneity in estimating the effect of 
political competition on voter turnout. 
 
A histogram of voter turnout in local elections separately for Jewish and Arab 
municipalities is presented in Figure 3. While the variation in voter turnout is large in 
the general population, this is not the case when the population is divided into two sub-
groups. In particular, the variation in voter turnout is relatively low across Arab 
municipalities and that might indicate that a common and important factor plays a role 
in shaping voter turnout in the Arab population. 
 
As can be seen from Table 1a, Arab municipalities are less populated, characterized by 
a higher degree of political competition and much poorer in terms of income per capita 
as compared to Jewish municipalities. At the outset, those three characteristics should 
generate higher voter turnout in Arab relative to Jewish municipalities. However, voter 
turnout in general elections in Jewish municipalities is higher in comparison with Arab 
ones, which is expected to work in the opposite direction in case voter turnout in 
general elections is a reasonable proxy for the intensity of civic duty.  
 
4.3 The results 
4.3.1 Hamula-based-voting 
The first stage of our empirical investigation is exploring the voting patterns of Arab 
communities in Israel. People who go to vote on an election day are seeking to increase 
the chances that their favorite candidate will win the race. Thus, examining whether 
voting behavior is influenced by hamulas is a prerequisite test that social groups are 
important in determining political participation.  
 
We use the last name of candidates and eligible voters as our proxy for social identity. 
Given that candidates' last names are public knowledge it is possible to explore the 
linkage between voters and candidate group affiliation in those municipalities where the 
Ministry of Interior allocates eligible voters to ballot boxes according to their last name.   14
 
The dependent variable is the share of votes that a certain candidate in a specific ballot 
box receives relative to the total number of votes in that same ballot box. In the standard 
race between two candidates each ballot box would have appeared once in our data set. 
However, each ballot box appears in the current empirical analysis more than once 
according to the number of candidates in that particular municipality given that more 
than two candidates could run for mayor. In general, the number of observations is the 
product of the number of ballot boxes and number of candidates. For example, the 
number of observations in a municipality that has 3 candidates and 3 ballot boxes 
equals 9.  
 
Table 2 presents regressions that test the hamula-based-voting hypothesis. As can be 
seen, a candidate with a certain last name receives around 13.5 percentage points more 
votes in a specific ballot box if the eligible voters who are assigned to that particular 
ballot box share that same last name. The coefficient of the last name variable is not 
very sensitive to the inclusion of fixed effects dummies for municipalities. This implies 
a quantitatively large effect given that the actual gap in terms of votes between the 
winner and the next candidate in line is 11.8 percentage points on average. 
 
Table 2 also includes a test of whether the voting behavior of hamula members is 
influenced by the probability of winning the election. We use two proxies for that 
probability: ex-post election results and hamula size.
13 The coefficient of group identity, 
as measured by voters' last name, is somewhat lower when an interaction between (ex-
post) winners and voters’ last name is used.
14 While voters are sensitive to the 
probability of winning (to the extent that ex-post results are correlated with ex-ante 
probability) they do vote more significantly for hamula-based-candidates that have 
lower chance of winning. 
 
We also use hamula size to test whether people with a sense of social identity would be 
likely to vote for hamula-based-candidates regardless of the probability of winning. 
Table 2 shows that the coefficient of the interaction between hamula size and last name 
is negative and quantitatively non-negligible. Voters are more likely to vote for “their 
                                                  
13  The way hamula size has been constructed is explained in the next section. 
14  This specification also includes an interaction between the winner dummy and municipality fixed 
effects.   15
candidates” if they are members of a large hamula as compared to a small hamula but 
even a member of small hamula (smaller chance of winning) still tend to vote for their 
affiliated candidate. This finding suggests that a significant share of the voters is not 
completely instrumental which is in line with the social identity argument. 
 
In 31 out of 75 municipalities, the mayoral race is between two (or more) candidates 
that have the same last name (i.e., the same hamula). This indicates that while the social 
structure of several hamulas plays an important role in local elections, a hamula is not 
the only factor. The estimated coefficients of last name in Table 2 capture that 
competition within the hamula.
15  
 
One more indication that local elections are affected by other factors in addition to 
hamula affiliation is the fact that not all hamulas are represented in the mayoral race. In 
particular, in 17 out of 75 municipalities, the biggest hamula fielded no candidate in the 
mayoral race. 
 
4.3.2 Interpretation of the results 
An alternative interpretation of hamula-based voting could be that individuals support 
people with the same last name because they expect to receive material benefits as a 
consequence. While we could not exclude completely the suggestion that material 
benefits might be involved in the decision of individuals to vote for hamula-based 
candidates, the evidence raise doubts on the significance of this assertion. 
 
One possible channel of directing material benefits to hamula members might be by 
lowering the effective local tax rate. While there is anecdotal evidence published in the 
popular press that some members associated with the mayor's hamula receive illegal tax 
treatment, the Interior Ministry imposes strict control on such behavior. A mayor who is 
caught favoring a particular group of people is removed from office. Furthermore, the 
existing evidence suggests that local tax collection in Arab municipalities that are 
characterized by stronger sense of hamula affiliation – indicated by the size of the 
biggest hamula – is similar to other Arab municipalities (Ben-Bassat et al, 2008). 
 
                                                  
15 Members of a certain hamula have to split their votes in case two or more candidates come from that 
same hamula. Consequently, the share of votes for each of the two (or more) candidates with a certain last 
name in a ballot box where voters share the same last name should be lower (relative to other ballot 
boxes) than the case of one candidate from each hamula.   16
Appointing relatives to various positions in a municipality might be another channel 
through which hamula members may expect to gain benefits from voting for hamula-
based candidates. However, the Israeli law strictly forbids hiring relatives of a mayor 
defined very broadly (the long list of relatives includes even cousin, son in law and 
grand children). 
 
Moreover, individuals should be organized by economic groups if voting behavior is 
mainly affected by the expected material benefits. The wealthier members of each 
hamula in a certain community might have more in common in terms of tax/expenditure 
policy than members of a particular hamula because unlike a tribe, a hamula consists of 
independent property-owning families. The claim that hamula-based voting could be 
the result of self-interested material benefits leaves open the question of why 
individuals are grouped specifically by hamula lines to achieve monetary goals.  
 
In contrast, our interpretation of social identity is consistent with additional external 
evidence. The rich relationship between hamula members has important non-material 
dimensions such as intra-marriage that has been discussed above and practices of blood 
vengeance. In Arab society blood revenge, which is culturally tolerable behavior, is not 
an individual matter. By killing a person from the other hamula, the murderer makes 
each and every member of his own hamula a justified death target. 
 
Several hundreds of court verdicts related to hamula conflicts were found in online law 
library in Israel. These verdicts are commonly colored in words such as honor, respect, 
loyalty and identity. In a recent case of violent hamula clash brought to court, Judge 
Aminof wrote, "the violent struggle taking place in the village of Tuba, that is basically 
driven by the pursuit of honor and recognition by hamulas, introduced blaze and unrest 
also in young people". (November 2005) 
 
Voting by hamula lines could be also consistent with social pressure argument. 
According to this argument, people might vote for hamula-based candidate because of 
the expected social sanctions the hamula imposes on those who do not show up to vote. 
In our context, it is easier to verify participation given that eligible voters are assigned 
to ballot boxes according to their last name, and as a result the social pressure argument 
might be even more important. The problem with this argument, however, is that a 
hamula cares about for whom an individual votes rather than participation and that act   17
is unobservable. In fact, voters with a certain last name do vote for candidates with 
different last name: the average share of votes to candidates in ballot boxes that do not 
contain their last name is about 18 percent (Table 1b). 
 
4.3.3 Constructing group size 
Following the previous empirical examination it would be natural to use the last name 
of an individual as our measure of social group affiliation. The Interior Ministry, with 
the help of Central Bureau of Statistics, provided us with data on the distribution of last 
names of all individuals age 20 years or over in 75 Arab municipalities in the year 2003. 
 
The raw data must be adjusted to account for differences between Arab and Hebrew 
transcription since the Arab last names are registered in Hebrew transcription in the 
Interior Ministry's files. Therefore, the same Arab last name could appear in several 
different spellings in Hebrew, which may introduce biases in hamula/group size that is 
based on last name. We have done extensive work to merge all individuals with 
different last name in Hebrew transcription into a particular hamula if they share the 
same last names in Arab transcription. 
 
The size of the group/hamula is the ratio of the number of individuals in a particular 
locality who are 20 years of age or older that share a certain last name divided by the 
total number of people in that same age group in that particular locality. To a large 
extent, that age group overlaps with those individuals who are eligible to vote in local 
elections (a person aged 17 or older is entitled to vote in local elections). The 
constructed group size approximately reflects the upper boundary of the size of 
hamula's constituency.
16 Note that the absolute size of hamula could be relatively large. 
The average number of members of the biggest hamula is 918, using our definition of 
hamula. 
 
4.3.3 Voter turnout and group size  
Table 3 presents the benchmark regression for voter turnout in the 2003 local elections. 
It is comprised of the following explanatory variables: national voter turnout, political 
                                                  
16 Hamula size has been used in the past to explore the social and political roles of the hamula. 
Comprehensive research on the evolution of hamula strength between the years 1910 to 1983 in the town 
of Shfara'am has found that hamula size (self-reported) is positively correlated with the tendency to vote 
for hamula-based lists in elections held in Shfara'am in the year 1983 (Al-Haj, 1988). Shavit and Pierce 
(1991) show that educational achievements are associated with hamula size.    18
competition, the log of eligible population and the log of income per capita. All 
variables including voter turnout were measured for the year 2003.  
 
As expected, the effect of national voter turnout on participation in local elections is 
positive and statistically significant. The coefficient of political competition is negative, 
which implies that a close race (lower difference in terms of votes between the winner 
and candidate next in line) tend to attract more voters to ballot boxes.  A similar finding 
has been established by many (but not all) of those who have previously studied 
political participation (Matsusaka and Palda, 1993). 
 
Table 3 also explores the possible bias in political competition coefficient due to 
candidates' response to an expected close race. As can be seen from Table 3 the 
coefficient is negative, as before, when political competition for the previous two 
elections (the average of 1993 and 1998 local elections) is employed instead of the 
current index of political competition. The use of a lag variable, however, generates a 
lower coefficient as would be predicted. 
 
The political competition indicator that is often calculated in terms of the percentages of 
total votes might be misleading in large elections as Schwartz (1987) suggested.
17  In 
contrast, there are 22 municipalities in our data base with a difference of less than 100 
votes between the winner and candidate next in line. In two of those municipalities 
there was a tie. We nevertheless use a variable for political competition in terms of 
percentages rather than the absolute number of votes to allow the inclusion of 
population size. Otherwise, multicollinearity between political competition and 
population size is likely to occur.   
 
The estimated coefficient of eligible population size is negative and significant, which 
is consistent with the instrumental view of voting. The size of that coefficient implies a 
large effect. For example, voter turnout in a municipality populated by 7,500 eligible 
voters, which replicates the average eligible population in Arab municipalities, is higher 
                                                  
17 Schwartz (1987, p.118) has used a compelling metaphor: "Saying that closeness increases the 
probability of being pivotal is like saying that tall men are more likely to bump their head on the moon."    19
by 12 percentage points as compared to a municipality with 37,000 eligible voters, 
which is the average eligible population in Jewish municipalities.
18 
 
This regression also shows that the effect of (log) income per capita on voter turnout in 
local elections is negative and significant, which is somewhat surprising.
19 A similar 
result with regard to the effect of income on voter turnout has been found for local 
elections in the US (Filer et al, 1993) and Belgium (Ashworth et al, 2006). This 
coefficient implies a large effect, but as will be evident below its size is very sensitive 
to the inclusion of additional variables and especially to our measure of social group 
size. 
 
This standard list of four variables has impressive explanatory power in accounting for 
voter turnout in local elections in Israel according to the adjusted R
2 (Table 3).
20 
However, the explanatory power of that list is substantially lower if the analysis is 
limited to Arab municipalities only (Table 4).  
 
The voting behavior of residents in Arab municipalities that are characterized by a 
unique social structure provides a quasi-natural experiment to test the hypothesis that 
social identity plays an important role in reconciling the paradox of voting. Naturally, 
examining the effect of social groups on voter turnout is limited to Arab localities, but 
we first start our investigation by comparing political participation in Arab and Jewish 
municipalities. 
 
Table 3 shows that voter turnout in Arab localities is significantly higher (the implied 
effect is around 17 percentage points) as compared to Jewish localities, controlling for 
the list of variables included in the basic regression. There is some variation within 
Arab municipalities, in that voter turnout among the Arab-Christian population is higher 
by “only” 13 percentage points in comparison to Jewish municipalities while it is higher 
by 19 percentage points in Druze municipalities.
21  
                                                  
18 Those estimates are based on a regression where voter turnout is used as a dependent variable instead 
of logistic transformation (not reported here). 
19 The results are similar using education level instead of income level (not reported here).  
20 Table 3 shows an interesting result: unlike the general elections where two particular sectors (Orthodox 
Jews and Jewish settlers beyond the Green Line) tend to participate at higher rates (12.5 and 9 percentage 
points above the national average, respectively) Orthodox and non-Orthodox Jewish municipalities have 
similar voter turnout in local elections and Jewish settlers have even lower voter turnout. 
21 These estimates are based on a specification that uses voter turnout as a dependent variable, instead of 
logistic transformation (not presented in the tables).   20
 
In the rest of this section we combine Arab-Muslim, Arab-Christian and Druze 
municipalities given the relatively small differences among Arab municipalities of 
various religious origins in terms of voting behavior. In fact, the variance of voter 
turnout in Arab municipalities is only around 5 percent.  
 
While all other coefficients remain highly significant and preserve their signs, the 
quantitative effects implied by most coefficients are sensitive to the inclusion of the 
Arab dummy variable. For example, the coefficient of income per capita is much 
smaller when a dummy for Arab municipality is added to the basic regression. 
 
The highly significant coefficient of Arab municipalities suggests that we should delve 
into the distinctive characteristics of the Arab population. Its social structure is a natural 
candidate to explain the high voter turnout in local elections. Table 4 presents results of 
regressions that include various measures of group size in addition to the standard 
control variables. Obviously, the analysis is restricted to Arab municipalities (75 
observations). 
 
In Table 4 both a linear and a quadratic form of the size of the biggest hamula is used as 
a measure of group size. The coefficient of measure is positive and significant whereas 
the coefficient of the square of that index is negative and almost significant. A similar 
picture emerges if we use the Herfindhal-Hirschman index instead of the size of the 
biggest  hamula as a measure of group size.
22 Those results are consistent with the 
comparative static prediction of recent theoretical models that grants social groups an 
important role in shaping individuals' voting behavior (See for example, Feddersen and 
Sandroni, 2006). 
 
According to the estimated coefficient, a rise of one standard deviation in the 
Herfindhal-Hirschman index would lead to an increase of 1.5 percentage points in voter 
turnout. This estimated impact of social identity on voter turnout may seem relatively 
small, but recall that the variance of voter turnout in Arab municipalities is 
approximately 5 percent only. 
 
                                                  
22  In fact, our findings are not sensitive to other measures of group size that have been employed such as 
the two, three and four biggest hamulas (not reported here).    21
Three out of the standard four variables are still statistically significant and with the 
expected signs even when the empirical analysis is limited to Arab municipalities. 
While the income per capita coefficient keeps its sign, it is no longer significant when 
the regressions are based on Arab municipalities only. Note that the coefficient of 
political competition implies larger effect on voter turnout in Arab municipalities. 
 
5. The compensation hypothesis 
An additional hypothesis was put forward to account for the intensive political 
participation of Arab residents in local elections. Both researchers and popular 
commentators have suggested that the very high voter turnout of Arab voters in local 
elections is the result of their relatively low turnout in general elections. However, this 
hypothesis has never been tested in a systematic way. 
 
There are two different channels through which compensation might work. First, the 
marginality of Arab voters in national elections may induce them to use local elections 
as their main field of political expression. Since the establishment of the State of Israel, 
Arabs have been allowed to vote and run as candidates for the Israeli parliament. 
However, Arab political parties were never asked to join the coalition and be part of the 
government. Some Arab parliament members were part of the coalition but only if they 
were associated with Zionist-based lists. Thus, it seems plausible to assume that the 
Arab population in Israel has less chance to affect political outcomes. According to this 
first channel, the benefit from the act of voting in local elections is seemingly higher 
due to the low probability of shaping the results in national elections. 
 
The second channel through which compensation voting occurs stems from the weak 
attachment of some Arab citizens may feel towards the Jewish nature of the state of 
Israel. Some of these Arab citizens may even deny the existence of Israel. As a result, 
some Arab citizens do not vote in general elections because they do not benefit from the 
act of voting in general elections, and for some of them voting may even reduce their 
utility. 
 
The stated boycott of two Arab political movements (the Islamic Movement and Bnei 
Ha-Kfar) that persuaded their supporters to refrain from voting in national elections 
provides direct evidence that indeed a small part of the Arab population in Israel does   22
perceive voting in national elections as a negative act that may lend legitimacy to the 
State of Israel. While these movements discourage their followers from voting in 
national elections, they do participate in local elections. In fact, the Islamic Movement 
even won elections for mayor in a few Arab municipalities. 
 
The compensation hypothesis states that some Arab voters benefit more from the act of 
voting in local elections because of their absence from general elections. Recall, 
however, that most eligible Arab voters do actually vote in national elections (Table 1a) 
and this type of compensation voting behavior should not apply to the majority of Arab 
population. 
 
According to the compensation hypothesis, we should expect different behavior in Arab 
municipalities with respect to the relations between local and national voter turnout. 
Unlike Jewish municipalities, we expect a negative correlation between local and 
national voter turnout in Arab municipalities (ceteris paribus) if indeed compensation 
voting behavior plays an important role. 
 
In Table 5 we introduce an interaction term between municipality origin and national 
voter turnout to account for different behavior. We also run the baseline regression 
separately for Arab and Jewish municipalities. The regression results strongly reject the 




This paper exploits the unique social structure of the Arab population in Israel to test 
whether social identity has a noticeable effect on voter turnout. Voter turnout in Arab 
municipalities in Israel has been around 90 percent since the first local elections. It is 
commonly hypothesized that the high political participation rate in Arab municipalities 
is related to the unique social structure of Arab communities. 
 
The hamula, which is a well-known social group in Arab communities, is our main 
social group. Hamula affiliation is measured in this paper by individuals' last names. 
All individuals who share the same last name form a social group or hamula. We find 
that hamula members tend to vote for hamula-based-candidates in local elections. In   23
particular we show that voters are more likely to vote for a candidate who shares their 
last name as compared to other candidates. This finding suggests that the hamula is a 
meaningful social group in terms of political behavior.  
 
Based on this finding, social groups in Arab communities are constructed using the last 
name as a measure of group affiliation. We find empirical evidence of an inverted U-
shaped relationship between social group size and voter turnout, which is consistent 
with recent theoretical models that incorporate social groups in the decision to vote (for 
example, Feddersen and Sandroni, 2006). 
 
Our finding, which is based on actual voting behavior, lends empirical support to the 
recent direction in voter turnout literature that attempts to explain the voting paradox by 
adding the benefits that an individual may gain by improving the welfare of his/her 
social group.  
 
We do not find empirical support for the compensation hypothesis, which attributes the 
high voter turnout of Arab residents in local elections to their marginality in national 
arena. Arab municipalities that are characterized by lower rates of voter turnout in 
national elections tend also to exhibit low levels of political participation in local 
elections. 
   24










































Income per capita 
0.089 
(0.096) 
-  -  Herfindhal-Hirschman Index 
19.1 
(13.5) 
-  -  Biggest hamula 
75  111  186  Number of municipalities 
Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
Table 1b: Descriptive Statistics – Ballot box level, 2003 
(35 Arab municipalities) 
  Average and standard deviation 
Number of eligible residents per ballot box 737 
(77) 
Number of voters per ballot box  652 
(81) 
Voter turnout (%)  88.5 
(6.35) 
Number of candidates   4.43 
(2.16) 
Size of biggest hamula (%)  16.2 
(10.16) 
Share of votes to candidates in ballot 
boxes that contain their last name 
31.5 
(25.01) 
Share of votes to candidates in ballot 
boxes that do not contain their last name 
18.1 
(18.21) 
Number of ballot boxes  354 
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Table 2: Effect of voter's last name on elections outcome 
Dependent variable: share of votes for candidates in 2003 local election  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant  ** * 18.1  
) 31.11 ( 
   
     




** * 13.5  
) 11.66 ( 
** * 13.3  
) 12.50 ( 
*** 11.8  
) 12.45 ( 
*** 19.1  
) 13.24 ( 
     
Winner*last 
name 
   * * * 8.6  
) 4.04 ( 
 





    ** * 11.9 -  
) 5.77 - ( 
     
Fixed  effects  No yes yes yes 
     
Observations 1612  1612  1612  1612 
Adjusted R
2 0.077      
R
2 – Within    0.090  0.148 0.113 
        Between    0.017  0.162 0.011 
        Overall    0.078  0.139 0.093 
 
*** Significance at 1%.  
** Significance at 5%.  
* Significance at 10%.   26
Table 3: Baseline regression  
Dependent variable: log [turnout/(1-turnout)] in 2003 local election  


























) 4.05 - (
0.006*** -
) 4.23 - (
0.006*** -
) 4.14 - (
0.008*** -





) 10.08 - (
0.256*** -
) 10.62 - (
0.266*** -
) 10.27 - (
0.393*** -
) 12.35 - (
0.358*** -




) 5.05 - (
0.396*** -
) 4.63 - (
0.441*** -
) 4.61 - (
1.468*** -
) 16.54 - (
1.219*** -



























186 186 186 146 186 Observations
0.882 0.890 0.885 0.836 0.762 Adjusted R
2 
 
*** Significance at 1%.  
** Significance at 5%.  
* Significance at 10%.    27
Table 4: Effect of social identity,  
Dependent variable: log [turnout/(1-turnout)] in 2003 local election  
) 5 (   ) 4 (   ) 3 (   ) 2 (   ) 1 (    
1.561**  
) 2.00 (  
1.782**  
) 2.33 (  
1.793**  
) 2.44 (  
1.967**  
) 2.70 (  
2.734***  
) 4.00 (  
Constant 
           
0.030***  
) 6.26 (  
0.030***  
) 6.18 (  
0.030***  
) 6.33 (  
0.029***  
) 6.16 (  
0.026***  
) 5.48 (  
Voter turnout in 
national elections 
           
0.014*** -
) 3.34 - (  
0.014** -  
) 3.31 - (  
0.015*** -  
) 3.46 - (  
0.014*** -  
) 3.37 - (  
0.014*** -  
) 3.07 - (  
Political 
competition index 
           
0.164** -  
) 2.29 - (  
0.167** -  
) 2.33 - (  
0.173** -  
) 2.46 - (  
0.173*** -  
) 2.45 - (  
0.221*** -  
) 3.13 - (  
Eligible population 
(log) 
           
0.044 -  
) 0.19 - (  
0.100 -  
) 0.43 - (  
0.037 -  
) 0.16 - (  
0.105 -  
) 0.45 - (  
0.173 -  
) 0.73 - (  
Income per capita 
(log) 
           
    3.722**  
) 2.12 (  
1.434**  
) 2.48 (  
  Herfindhal-
Hirschman Index 
           
    6.047 -  
) 1.38 - (  
    Herfindhal-
Hirschman Index 
^2 
           
0.027*  
) 1.94 (  
0.011**  
) 2.46 (  
      Biggest hamula 
           
0.000 -  
) 1.24 - (  
        Biggest hamula ^2 
75   75   75   75   75   Observations 
0.414   0.410   0.418   0.410   0.367   Adjusted R
2 
 
*** Significance at 1%.  
** Significance at 5%.  
* Significance at 10%.  
   28
Table 5: Effect of compensation motive 








) 3 (   ) 2 (   ) 1 (    
2.734***  
) 4.00 (  
2.381***  
) 5.22 (  
2.113***  
) 3.76 (  
Constant 
       
0.026***  
) 5.48 (  
0.019***  
) 4.67 (  
0.020***  
) 3.87 (  
Voter turnout in national elections 
       
0.014** -  
) 3.07 - (  
0.004*** -  
) 3.56 - (  
0.006*** -  
) 4.02 - (  
Political competition index 
       
0.221*** -  
) 3.13 - (  
0.276*** -  
) 11.83 - (  
0.260*** -  
) 9.48 - (  
Eligible population (log) 
       
0.173 -  
) 0.73 - (  
0.478*** -  
) 6.80 - (  
0.423*** -  
) 4.94 - (  
Income per capita (log) 
       
    *** 1.186  
) 7.55 (  
Arabs 
       
    0.127  
) 0.90 (  
Arabs* Voter turnout in national 
elections 
75   111   186   Observations 
0.367   0.786   0.882   Adjusted R
2 
 
*** Significance at 1%.  
** Significance at 5%.  
* Significance at 10%. 
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